Achieving Air Pollution Control Targets with Technology-Aided Monitoring: Better Enforcement or Localized Efforts?
Yang Lin, Yatang Lin, Jin Wang, and Fangyuan Peng. 2024.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 16 (4): 280–315.
Abstract
Weak enforcement of environmental regulations remains a global issue due to inadequate monitoring and misaligned incentives. This paper examines the effects of automated monitoring on achieving air pollution control targets amidst China's war on pollution. Utilizing the staggered rollout process and remote-sensing data, we find local governments respond to the advanced monitoring system by strategically targeting areas near monitors, resulting in a 3.2 percent decrease in pollution adjacent to automated monitors compared to areas farther away. Furthermore, we observe heterogeneity in response across cities with varying degrees of preexisting data manipulation and among officials facing different incentives and public pressure.